Moral Skepticism | What Can Disagreement Show?

A person holding a magnifying glass, symbolizing critical thinking, over a book titled 'Ethical Skepticism'. - ethical skepticism

ethical skepticism in Philosophy and Theology

Suppose two people agree that keeping a confidence will expose someone else to avoidable harm. One thinks loyalty requires keeping the confidence. The other thinks preventing harm takes priority. Their disagreement survives agreement about what will happen. Moral skepticism, sometimes called ethical skepticism, asks what kinds of truth or knowledge are available in judgments like these. J. L. Mackie used moral disagreement to argue against objective values. David Enoch examines what a disagreement would have to show for that argument to succeed. J. L. Mackie, The Subjectivity of Values · David Enoch, How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?

From what happens to what someone ought to do

David Hume noticed that writers on morality often move from describing the world to saying what someone ought to do, without explaining the transition. In the confidence example, the fact that silence exposes someone to harm is relevant to the decision. The argument also needs a reason to treat preventing that harm as more important than the obligation of confidence in these circumstances. Hume’s observation directs attention to the step that connects the facts to the judgment. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3.1.1.27

Mackie’s argument from different ways of life

Mackie distinguishes a first-order moral judgment, such as a judgment about breaking a promise, from a second-order view about the status of moral judgments. His skepticism concerns the second question. A person can take a strong practical stand and still ask whether values exist independently of what people approve of or condemn. J. L. Mackie, The Subjectivity of Values

In his argument from relativity, Mackie observes that moral codes vary across ways of life. He proposes that participating in different social practices explains much of that variation. To him, the pattern is easier to explain that way than by supposing that people in different societies are trying to perceive the same objective values and frequently getting them wrong. The argument turns on which explanation fits the variation better. J. L. Mackie, The Subjectivity of Values

What a disagreement can show

Enoch distinguishes disputes about moral principles from disputes about the facts to which an agreed principle applies. In the confidence example, if two people both prioritise preventing serious harm but disagree about whether serious harm will occur, evidence about the consequences might resolve the dispute. If they agree about the consequences and continue to give loyalty and prevention of harm different weights, the disagreement reaches further. David Enoch, How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?

Enoch accepts that some disagreements reach that further level and examines what follows. The realist can ask whether there are alternative explanations for the disagreement, or whether a particular argument has established that objective moral truths should produce agreement. Explaining why two people came to hold different views and deciding whether either view is true are separate tasks. David Enoch, How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?

Conclusion

Moral skepticism asks what justifies a moral judgment and what kind of truth it can claim. Hume draws attention to the reasoning between a description and an obligation. Mackie asks whether different ways of life explain the pattern of moral disagreement. Enoch asks what that pattern would have to establish about objective truth. Together, the arguments show why identifying the point of disagreement matters before drawing a conclusion from it.

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