Questions about free will often arise when we want to know whether someone is responsible for an action. Imagine a sailor who throws cargo overboard to save a ship, a person whose decision would have been overridden had he chosen differently, and someone who steps on another person’s hand by accident. Aristotle, Harry Frankfurt and P. F. Strawson used examples like these to examine different aspects of control. Their arguments ask what the person chose, what actually led to the action and what the action expressed toward other people. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III · Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” · Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”
Aristotle’s sailor chooses under pressure
In Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle contrasts being carried somewhere by wind or other people with throwing goods overboard in a storm. In the first case the force comes from outside and the person contributes nothing to the movement. In the second, the sailor intentionally discards goods to protect the crew. He would ordinarily choose to keep the cargo, but the circumstances give him a reason to act differently. Aristotle calls actions of this kind mixed and places them closer to voluntary actions because the person chooses what to do at the time. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.1
The example gives pressure a specific role. The storm makes the alternatives costly and changes which action is worth taking. The sailor still acts for a purpose. Aristotle goes on to ask what someone can reasonably be expected to endure under pressure. That helps explain why judging an action may require knowing both what a person did and what was at stake when they did it. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.1
Frankfurt asks whether another outcome is necessary
In 1969 Frankfurt tested a principle that makes moral responsibility depend on the ability to do otherwise. He imagines that Black wants Jones to perform a particular act. Black waits, ready to intervene if Jones shows signs of deciding against it. Jones decides for his own reasons to do what Black wanted, so Black never intervenes. The setup gives Jones only one possible outcome while leaving the actual decision to his own reasoning. Frankfurt, pp. 835–837
Frankfurt argues that Black’s unused plan should make no difference to the responsibility Jones would have borne if left entirely alone. On his account, the absence of an alternative and the explanation of the decision are two separate facts. The example asks readers to assess the connection between them. Someone who thinks an alternative is required still has to explain which opportunity Jones would need and why. The wider guide to free will describes how such questions connect with determinism. Frankfurt, pp. 836–838
Strawson asks what a person’s conduct expresses
In a lecture delivered in 1962, Strawson imagines someone stepping on his hand. The injury could feel equally painful if the person did it accidentally while trying to help or if the person acted out of malice. Strawson says his resentment would differ. He uses the example to show how responses such as gratitude, resentment and forgiveness depend partly on what conduct reveals about people’s intentions and regard for each other. British Academy, lecture record · Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” section II
That approach brings an everyday question into the free-will debate. Learning why the person stepped on the hand can change whether resentment seems appropriate while leaving the injury itself just as real. Strawson asks how such responses fit into the practice of holding people responsible. Strawson, sections II–III
Conclusion
The sailor’s choice shows why the circumstances matter to what counts as voluntary. Frankfurt’s example separates the availability of another outcome from the reasons for what Jones actually did. Strawson examines the intentions that make a response such as resentment intelligible. Each example isolates a different part of a judgment about responsibility. Keeping those questions separate helps clarify what someone is claiming when they say a person acted freely.
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